Here are five more reasons I 'might' be (considered) a spy:
6. One of my primary sources/associates, a foreign national providing information about the spy game, was accused of being an Agent of MI6.
One of my foreign sources was rumored to be a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) agent for MI6, the real-life home of the fictional super-agent James Bond. Fingers were pointed in multiple directions over this fiasco, with everyone denying any and all knowledge including the accused. Some suspected the rumor had been designed to deter meetings between a former USAF intelligence officer and our source. Another suggested the rumor may have originated with the wife of an intelligence person who had met with our source in Washington, D.C. and allegedly told her husband she thought our source was a spy.
In the end it all appeared to be a puff of smoke intended to momentarily distract or dissuade those of us already confused by the hall of mirrors.
7. Elicitation
I founded STARstream Research to gather and analyze intelligence on emerging science and technology trends. (Some of those trends include UFO-inspired science-fiction technologies and exotic mind-brain research.)
If you're in the intelligence gathering and reporting business you probably rely on basic methods, including "elicitation" to obtain information.
Elicitation is a useful technique often used by "rogue journalists" acting as investigative reporters, as well as spies.
One explanation of "elicitation," provided by the US government Department of Energy:
In the espionage trade, elicitation is the term applied to subtle extraction of information during an apparently normal and innocent conversation.
Conducted by a skillful intelligence collector, elicitation appears to be normal social or professional conversation and can occur anywhere – in a restaurant, at a conference, or during a visit to one’s home.
As an intelligence technique, elicitation exploits several fundamental aspects of human nature.
- Most of us want to be polite and helpful, so we answer questions even from relative strangers.
- We want to appear well informed about our professional specialty, so we may be tempted to say more than we should.
- We want to be appreciated, and to feel that we are doing something important and useful. As a result, we often talk more expansively in response to praise about the value or importance of our work.
- As open and honest people, we are often reluctant to withhold information, lie, or be suspicious of others’ motives.
As for the government's advice?
BE AWARE TO WHOM YOU ARE SPEAKING AND TO WHOM YOUR CONVERSATION MAY BE REPORTED. DON’T BE PARANOID, JUST BE CAREFUL.
8. The Spies, Lies, and Polygraph Tape Affair: Counterintelligence Operation or Internet Fiasco?
In the fall of 2006 one of my sources provided a series of email messages alleged to have been released by a sitting DNI DIA official (you can probably guess who this person is).
Most of the messages concerned an investigative interest on the part of the official as to whether or not a certain former intelligence officer might have been working for a foreign government, and covering his tracks using UFO-related disinformation. The affair was closely linked to a group of foreign documentary film makers. The use of documentary film makers as cover for intelligence collection is well known.
More recently the DIA has been given a green-light to conduct "Offensive Counterintelligence" actions, including within the United States, if they involve foreign nationals.
DIA announced this new counterintelligence offensive at a Media Roundtable.
Offensive CI operations are – CI folks call OFCO – are clandestine CI activities run in support of DOD military national security objectives and programs against individuals known or suspected to be foreign intelligence officers with connections to foreign intelligence or international terrorist activities. And they’re run to counter the foreign intelligence operations, espionage, against DOD national activities and, of course, terrorist operations against DOD or national. These are very tightly controlled departmental activities run by a small group of specially selected people within DOD. There are only four organizations in the department that can run these operations – Army Counterintelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and now DIA with the center.
The SLP affair involved DIA and a former Air Force Office of Special Investigations person of interest.
During the August 5th, 2008 press conference, director of counterintelligence for USD(I) Toby Sullivan stated:
"Until about two years ago, DIA did not have the authority to run these ops. The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, at the request or in response to a request from DIA, granted them a two-year trial basis to run these things. So my shop has been working with DIA, as did CIFA, to help them build this capability. And they performed admirably."
Curiously this was about the same time period as the SLP affair.
When questioned about the operations that had taken place beginning in 2006, Sullivan added:
"There have been investigations come from these offensive CI operations. There have been spies caught because of someone else making a mistake and us catching up on it. But by and large, these are not run to identify spies. They are run to thwart what the opposition is trying to do to us and to learn more about what they’re trying to get from us ... Our focus in the investigation in working with the FBI is the DOD person. If we’re involved in an espionage investigation, it will be looking at the person in the department of Defense who is allegedly spying for somebody else. In the operation, we’re going after the somebody else."
As for Internet espionage?
When questioned, Sullivan responded:
" [I] can’t talk about any kind of operational activity, but you have people using the Internet to meet and talk and speak to each other and you have people communicating. So you can have that opportunity for folks who need it as much as you can have an opportunity for folks to meet in a restaurant."
9. Emails that go directly to the Department of Justice
At least one source has confirmed that all of our email messages are copied in real time and go directly to the Department of Justice. Note this is also recommended by government policy to thwart suspected elicitation by a real foreign operative:
To discourage someone who seems to be too pushy about discussing sensitive information or arranging a private meeting with you, state that you would have to clear this with your security office. That is the last thing an intelligence operative wants to hear. It usually causes him/her to back off immediately, as no intelligence operative wants the FBI or CIA to become aware of their contact with you.
10. Many of my sources have questioned whether or not I actually am a spy.
Once you enter the murky world of the spy games, you can never trust anyone, completely.
I created STARpod.org as an outlet on the Internet to provide a glimpse into the strangeness that infects the intersecton of human intelligence and extra-ordinary techno-phenomenology.
Although I cannot share everything be assured I will post updates on my on-going investigations of the intersection of America's alternative community with the world of intelligence.
I hope to review documents and am considering redacted versions of additional material for the public STARpod.org website.
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